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RULES
U.R.C.P. Rule 54(e)
the judgement.

-

Interest and costs to be included in

iii

STATEMENT OF FACTS, A REPLY WITH ARGUMENT

Respondents

have

misstated

the

language of the Judgment.

The interest of $2,180.00 was the amount of interest the Judgment
allowed from

the date

There can be no
changing what

of judgement until the judgment was paid.

other

interpretation

is said.

To

of

did

only until

the date of

contrary to the pleadings which were prepared by the

Plaintiffs themselves
never

language without

read in the idea that the $2,180.00

was intended by the Court to apply until
judgment is

the

correct

language is

and ignores
their

the fact

judgment.

somewhat unclear.

that the Plaintiffs

Even Respondents admit the

That

means it

can be construed

against them under the circumstances.
The June

5, 1979 Order permitted the Defendants to take any

appropriate action when the Judgment was

sought to

be enforced.

That appropriate action was very broad, and applied to all of the
Defendants arguments which were
Motion when the Order was given.
elements, but because the
served.

All of

them are

raised

in

connection

with the

The Court did not specify those

Defendants

did,

they

still

are re-

a defense to enforcement of the Judg-

ment .
Although the Court subsequently
ruled on

alleged

it

had previously

various motions filed by the Defendants, it in fact had

not.

Plaintiffs refer the Court to the trial record at 101 which

is a

motion by the Defendants for certain relief.

motion comes in the midst of a flurry
as early

as at

of motions

However, that
which commence

least October 8 (Record at 94 et. sec). Defend1

ants pointed out to the Court

numerous motions

and issues which

had never been ruled upon, and showed that the Court had reserved
to the

Defendants the

though the

right to

Court had

not actually

Court in its

decision

claimed that

no new

of

matters had

tiffs were

30,

1982,

been raised

Record

at 110,

if these

have been

The Court did not discuss

of the

judgment which Plain-

trying to collect, even though at page 101 Defendants

made mention of the fact that the judgment
tiffs to

Even

that had not pre-

However,

decisions were well hid.

the question of interest in excess

action.

dealt with these issues, the

November

viously been decided by the Court.
decided, the

take appropriate

try for

as much

did not

allow Plain-

money as they were trying for.

the Court allowed Defendants the right

to raise

Since

various motions

whenever enforcement was attempted, Defendants were free to raise
that issue again and again.

Moreover, the

Court's Order, Record

110, did not amend the Judgment, nor could it have.
In pleadings

dated November 8, 1982, Record 108, Plaintiffs

admitted they took the judgment as stated and also compounded the
interest.

Nowhere in the judgment is this permitted.

The remainder of Respondent's factual allegations lack merit
or are disposed of in the Brief of Appellants.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Judgment
amount, which

did

not

the judgment

until the judgment was paid.
The

Court

allowed

the

bear

interest

beyond

a specified

provided would be the amount allowed
The judgment

Defendants
2

was never

changed.

to make all the appropriate

motions if
have the

the Plaintiff's
Judgment allow
The

fact,

a

support

enforce the

accruing interest,

changed but was not.
would

tried to

one case

To

it should have been

provided by

conclusion

Judgment,

Plaintiffs, in

that the Judgment and Order

below should be reversed,

ARGUMENT
Respondents cite one case only.

Dairy Distributor's Inc. v.

Local Union 976 et al. 12 U2d 85, 396 P2d 47 (1964), is argued as
authority by Respondents for

a conclusion

that interest follows

the judgment where statutory interest is permitted.
judgment in
interest.

instant

It omitted

less than
broader

the

it.

what might
and

the

case

did

not

provide

Instead, the

have been

judgment

better.

the pleadings been
Under the circum-

stances, statutory interest is not permitted.
butors,

the

Plaintiff

filed

a

motion

for statutory

judgment provided far

allowed had

drafted

However, the

in

In

Dairy Distri-

1963

to amend the

Plaintiffs* 1957 judgment to provide for interest.
showed the

clerk of

the Court

The findings

failed, because of oversight and

inadvertence, to fill in blanks provided for interest
54(e) .

That Rule

any judgment
The instant

says that

signed by
case does

the clerk, or filling
tained.

the clerk must include interest in

him, if

the same

not involve
in blanks.

has been ascertained.

the signing of a judgment by
No

more interest

was ascer-

The judgment was signed by the Judge and prepared by the

Plaintiff.
instant

under Rule

No

case.

oversight
No

clerk

or

inadvertence

oversight
3

or

is

alleged

inadvertence

in the
exists.

Respondents filed no motion to correct
collect

it

before

it

expired.

the judgment

and did not

They have, however, tried to

broaden its terms in their effort to renew the judgment.
Respondents wrongfully ask this Court to affirm more
mere

correction

of

an

inadvertent

omission.

clerk's omission in Dairy Distributors,
apply 15-1-4,

U. C.

the

than a

Because of the

Court

was

able to

A. and say interest would be accrued and be

collectable even though the

judgment did

not so

provide.

But,

Section 15-1-4 U.C.A. also says interest must be specified in the
judgment.
fails

The present case not

entirely

to

include

Respondents want to add.
judgment

"did

not

so

should

be

able

language

to

an empty
specify

This case is not a
provide"

specific amount, which limited
lawyer

only lacks

to

for

it

interest.

does

the interest

situation where the

Plaintiffs from
see

blank, but

It

provided a

any more.

Any

not specify accruing

interest.
A mere lapse of

time is

not the

problem with

judgment, as it was in Dairy Distributors.

the instant

There were additional

problems with the language, which foreclosed more interest.
One reason Respondents refer to no more cases
is the

fact that

Dairy Distributors

has been

twice, neither of which help Plaintiffs, but the

than this one

referred to only
other two cases

are of interest. It was cited along with other cases to support a
New Mexico decision in Barker v. Barker 608
to allow

a July

P2d 138

(N„M. 1980)

1, 1977 Indiana divorce decree to be given full

faith and credit by New Mexico

in its

December 21,

1978 Order.

However, as in Dairy Distributors and unlike the instant case, no
4

terms or conditions were added to the Indiana decree.

The action

dealt with New Mexico full faith and credit jurisdiction only.
In another

divorce case, Preece v. Preece 682 P2d 298 (Utah

1984) , this Court referred to Dairy Distributors for authority
". . . to do an act upon one date and make

it effective

as of a

prior date so that the record accurately reflects that which took
place."

Id., at

299.

The

Christoffersen's Court.

Preece

was

also

from Judge

The Judge in the hearing said the decree

would be final "upon signing".
Preece died,

case

He signed

the decree

after Mr.

and made the divorce effective on the hearing date.

This very Court recognized that action

by the

trial court

as a

substantial departure from the earlier announcement, and directed
that the decree be vacated and the action dismissed.
was

Mrs.

spouse.
be the

Preece

was

a

surviving

The result

widow instead of a divorced

This Court said even nunc pro tunc orders ". .
reflection of

. should

a previously made ruling" Id. at 300.

instant case lacks a previously

made

ruling

to

The

support Plain-

tiffs1 position.
The function of nunc pro tunc orders is not to make an order
"now for then, but to enter
made" Id.

at 299.

now

for

then

an

order previously

Since there was never a previous order in the

instant case allowing anything more than "interest from
hereof (April

18, 1979)

until paid

(it was paid, but Plaintiff

never recognized payment) in the amount
of

more

interest

is

contrary

to

the date

of $2,180.00", allowance

law and not allowed.

Judge

Christoffersen's Order should be vacated here, just as his extralegal action in Preece was disallowed in 1984.
5

CONCLUSION

Neither

Dairy

Distributors

allow the Plaintiffs or
beyond what

nor

the trial

its terms allowed*

any other authority would

court to

expand the Judgment

The Writs of Execution should be

stricken as requested by Defendants.
Respectfully submitted this

jn

day of July, 1987,

±

Raymond N. Malouf
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
/T day of July, 1987 four
copies of the foregoing RESPONDENTS REPLY BRIEF regarding Case
No. 870128-CA, postage prepaid to the following:
N. George Daines, Esq.
DAINES & KANE
108 North Main, Suite 200
Logan, Utah 84321

.

Raymond N. Malouf
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STATUTES
Utah Code (1953)
Section 15-1-4
Any judgment rendered from a lawful
contract shall conform thereto and shall bear the
interest agreed upon by the parties, which shall be
specified in the judgment *
Attached

RULES
U . R . C . P . Rule 5 4 ( e )
t h e judgement

-

I n t e r e s t and c o s t s t o be i n c l u d e d
Attached

in

Raymond N. Malouf/dm
MALOUF, MALOUF & JENKINS
Attorneys for Defendants
150 East 200 North #D
Logan, UT 84321
Telephone: 752-9380
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE

NORMAN BARBER and HELEN
BARBER, husband and wife,
Plaintiff
vs.
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP,
and VON K. STOCKING,
DON A. WHITE, JR., and
RAYMOND N. MALOUF, JR.,
general partners,
Defendant

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
AMD TO STRIKE
SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS

Civil No. 17630

Defendant Raymond N. Malouf requests relief from that
judgment entered against him on April 18, 1979. Defendant
further moves for this Court to strike the Supplemental
Proceedings against this Defendant pending resolution of
this motion. The basis for this motion, notwithstanding the
Court's recent Memorandum Decision of October 19, 1982, and
the reason relief should be granted (and the justification of
this relief notwithstanding prior decisions) is as follows:
1.
The Court said October 19, 1982 that Defendant's
April 28, 1982 Motion for Relief from Judgment was not
timely filed. Yet, most of the same arguments were raised
after the Judgment and prior to the Court's Memorandum
Decision of May 21, 1979, to wit: that the Plaintiff's
status as limited partners Imposed restrictions on the time
and manner of payment, both according to the partnership
agreement and according to Utah Code, Section 48-2-14(1);
and that in view of the then current cash flov problems of
the Emporium entity, Plaintiffs were restricted from proceeding
to collect. Several other points were also raised in the
detailed pleadings dated May 21, 1979 and April 30, 1979
from the Defendants. In its Memorandum Decision dated
May 21, 1979, the Judge stated:
Defendant has filed a motion for amendment to the
judgement, relief from judgment and a stay of execution.
Generally the thrust of Defendants' argunent goes to
questions of how the judgment should be enforced and
priorities in connection therewith.

neso-27
EXHIBIT

UL

Therefore, Defendant3f Motion ^o u t a ^ u , ^*_ course,
without prejudice to take any appropriate action when
the Judgment is thought to be enforced.
supplied).
~~—"
The underlined language

^ e*
wen 1 • ds\*

was obviously not to be

(Emphasis

*.j length of the decision,
*• i, wa.s nof ,

Even

though it is unusual language for a Memorandum Decision n\\ a
Summary Judgment Motion, it certainly must mean something.
Defendants believe it must ttow be applied to this Judgment
according to several factors which existed including (1) the
Bankruptcy Law that existed at the time; (2) the status of
the partnership; and (3) the status of the agreements in
effect between the Plaintiffs as partners lending money and
the Defendant.

Defendants believed then, and believes now,

and relied en the belief, that the Court did not believe
that the co 11 ec11.on o £ the j udgment was en forceab 1 e at the
time the Memorandum Decision was rendered because of all the
arguments the Defendants had raised, and that those arguments
were not rejected.
Defendants strongly be1ieve that the 1 "ourt, in its
Memorandum Decision of October 19, 1982, has not addressed
the question of exactly what "appropriate action" is in the
event enforcement is attempted in view of the arguments
raised by Defendants pleadings entitled "Reply. . ." and
dated May 13, 1982,

In that pleading Defendants argued that

the Plaintiffs were estopped because of their limited
partnership status, Utah law, and the contract from proceeding
against this Defendant.

The Court, after argument, indicated

it would review the arguments in the pleadings.

Because of

the May 21, 1979 decision, it should not have dismissed
Defendants 1 argument as having been 1 1 ntime J y fi1ed, because
they had been timely filed April 30 and May 21, 1979, and
were kept in reserve by the Court f s decision on May 21,
1979.

The door having been left open by the Court on May 21,

1979, \i

should now provide an interpretati on as to what the

"appropriate action" was, by applying that standard to each
of the arguments raised by the Defendants.

This is necessary

to permit the Court's order to make sense to either adequately
explain, to the Defendants what was intended or to provide a
basis for appellate revi ew.
2.

Rule 60(b) U.R.CJ-",

lies not present a timeliness issue

under subparts 5, 6 and 7.

It is under these subparts that

this motion is made, as wau the April 21, 1982 Motion.

EXHIBIT A

95

3. Defendant herein makes two arguments for the fact,
under subpart (5) of Rule 60(b), that the Judgment is void.
First, the pleadings do not at any point reflect the fact
that this Defendant was a general partner at the time the
Barber's note was signed by Von Stocking and Don White in
November of 1977. For purposes of this pleading, Defendant
herein did admit he was a general partner, but the admission,
as framed by the pleading, can only go to the status in
January 1979, when the suit was filed. There is no basis to
believe this Defendant was a general partner for the prior
debt, which this suit was all about. The general partner
does not assume the debts of an entity in which he was not a
general partner unless there is a specific acknowledgement
to that fact, and there was none. Neither the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law nor any pleadings say this
Defendant was a general partner when that note was signed,
or make a finding that he should be accountable for the
note. Accordingly, it should be found that the judgment is
void as against this Defendant because the pleadings don't
support the judgment. Or, the Plaintiff should have to
litigate the question of whether this Defendant was a general
partner at the time the note was signed in view of the fact
that he has never admitted personal liability for that note,
his signature did not appear on the note, nor did his name
appear with any payments on the note from the partnership,
checks of the partnership. See Davis v. West et. al, 71
F.Supp 377. A partner is not liable for contracts concluded
before he became a partner without a special agreement. The
judgment can be modified to exclude such a partner.
Second, the judgment as it is attempted to be enforced
is void against this Defendant because this Defendant is not
jointly and severally liable even if he was a general partner
at the time the note was signed. To wit, the Complaint, the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the Judgment
all fail to recite joint and several liability, and Section
48-1-12 of the Utah Code Annotated does not permit joint and
several liability. This was argued as point three in the
reply dated May 13, 1982. Also referred to is the case of
Palle v. Industrial Commission, 7 P2d 284 which required
proceeding against members on a debt jointly, and not separately.
Thus the distinction between "joint" and "joint and several11
is critical in this case, and the judgment is voidable
against this Defendant as this Defendant singled out for
proceedings separately from all other Defendants which is

EXHIBIT A
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contrary to 4 8 - 1 - 1 2 , U t a h Code Annotated, Defendant believes
P l a i n t i f f w a n t s p a y m e n t of the w h o l e debt from, hi 11 alone
based o n the P l a i n t i f f ' s efforts and such a result Is not
w i t h i n the m e a n i n g o f U C A 4 8 - 1 - 1 2 or the Bankruptcy laws as
they exist at t h e time o f the J u d g m e n t , w h i c h required
payment o f a p a r t n e r s
*< v \ hi a
:** , -»r- -t- payment >f
p a r t n e r s h i p d e b t s . S e e R .le 5(g) B r t nkn:u
u-* -*
Rep
9 8 9 , 9 5 t h c o n g r e s s , 2nd °^
- '••*•.
4. De f e nd an t a 1 s o r e q ue s t s r e 3 i e f i i nd e r s ub p a r a g r a oh (6 )
of Rule 6 0 ( b ) in that I t i s no longer e q u i t a b l e that the
J u d g m e n t shouId h a v e prospect: ive app 1 icat ion agains t thi s
D e f e n d a n t in v i e w o f t h e foregoing a r g u m e n t s and the c o n t e n t s
o f the p l e a d i n g s in t h e file a n d the prior d e c i s i o n s o f this
C o u r t , w h i c h s p e c i f i c a l l y permit the D e f e n d a n t s t o , w i t h o u t
p r e j ud ice , t ake ' * app r op r i a t e ac 11 o n"'' i £ en f or c emen t o f t he
J u d g m e n t i s a 1 1 erapt e d ,

B e c a u s e i:r 1: i e C o n r t ] e a d D e f e n d a n t s

to b e l i e v e that they could take a p p r o p r i a t e a c t i o n w h e n the
j u d g m e n t w a s s o u g h t to b e e n f o r c e d , the D e f e n d a n t s rightly
b e l i e v e d that included in that a p p r o p r i a t e a c t i o n is t h e
right t o r e 1 y on t he s t a 11 11 e s o f t h 1 s s t at e a nd t he U. S . as
w e l l as t h e a g r e e m e n t made by the P l a i n t i f f s notwithstandi ng
the j u d g m e n t t h e Court e n t e r e d . T h e Judgment b e c a u s e o f the
q u a l i f i c a t i o n in t h e C o u r t ' s m e m o r a n d u m d e c i s i o n and the
s u b s e q u e n t l y e n t e r e d o r d e r , is not e n f o r c e a b l e w i t h o u t
l i m i t a t i o n s , and 1,s not e n £ o r c e a b 1 e sing 1 y against this
Defendant.
5 , De f e nd a n t: s a 1 s o r eq ue s t relief u nd e r Ru 1 e 60 (b ) (7) f o r
the reason that if this Defendant is to be considered a
g e n e r a 1 p a r t n e r f o r p ur ;> o • s o £ c h e d e £ ens e , l: h e n h i s a s s e t s
are s ub j e c t t o t he p r o v i s • ns in S ect i on 72 3(a) o £ the
B a n k r u p t c y R e f o r m A c t , 7 is inconceivable that the Court
would consider Defendants' Motion for Relief under this
section as untimely in vi€*w of the fact that the Bankruptcy
status of the partnership was created, well after the judgment
in May of 1979, Bankruptcy was file*! tn November 1^79, and
the matter was converted to a liquidation bankruptcy in May
of 1981, where it still resides. Plaintiffs should be
estopped from actions in State Court under the Stay Order.
These recent attempts at; Supplemental Proceedings have been
the first since the bankruptcy. The -Appropriate relief
contemplated by the Court in May of 1979 certainly cou! A
include the Stay Order issued by the Bankruptcy Court, and
the provisions of section 723(a) of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act.

Defendant requests tl ie Court: to specifically address

i t s r e a s o n i n g , i £ a n y , f o r r e j e c t i n g t h I. s c 1 a i m £ o r r e 1 i e £

EXHIBIT h

6. Petitions for relief under Rule 60(b)(5, 6, 7) do not
face a time limit for asking for relief. The Court is also
permitted to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the Court.
A review of the pleadings on this matter abundantly shows
that initial counsel for the Plaintiffs purpetrated fraud,
either by mistake or on purpose, by failing to allege and
prove that this Defendant was a partner at the time the note
was signed or was otherwise responsible for the note. He
only alleged parter status at the time the pleadings were
filed. The Court was also misinformed by Plaintiffs who
presented arguments which wholly ignored the fact that the
Plaintiffs had signed an agreement which prospectively
governed the circumstances of their loan to the partnership.
There is adeqaute basis for this Court to set aside the
judgment as it applies to this Defendant for all of these
reasons, too.
DATED this <S 0 day of October, 1982.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the
day of October, 1982
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to N.
George Daines, Esq., Attorney for Plaintiffs, 128 North
Main, Logan, Utah 84321 by depositing said copy in the U.S.
mail, postage prepaid.
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Raymond N. Malouf/dm
MALOUF, MALOUF & JENKINS
Attorneys for Defendants
150 East 200 North #D
Logan, UT 84321
Telephone: 752-9380
PI STRICT C01PR7, ".TA'IT

1" UTAH ,

NORMAN BARBER and HELEN
BARBER, husband and wife,
PI aintiff

"'"tHN'l V" IF" CAl'Ml'

ORDER

vs.
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP,
and VON K. STOCKING,
DON A. WHITE, JR., and
RAYMOND N. MALOUF, JR.,
general partners,
Defendant

Civil No. 17630

Based on the Mqtion for Relief from Judgment presented
to this Court by ro«Jendant Raymond M. I falouf, the Court
hereby g-tiirilyre^ the Motion In Supplemental Proceedings, which
was ordered for the 1st day of November, 1982, U*
DATED this J**/ day of
<^C/

VeNoy
Dist

:sen,
Coi&rt Judge

l%3u-M
SOC'K

(SL^

EXH1B1
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Ifcrcenter 1 , 1932
17630

Wormm & Helen 3arber
VE NOY CHRISTOFFERSEM, Judge

Plaintiff1

Judge
George Parker, Court Reporter
Court Reporter

The £rpor±um Partneiship
....^.fflfoffS

Defendant

Type of hearing:
Preeent:

Suf .p. Proceeding* .
Pttf

Deft _ . .

XX

..... OSC

Court Cleric

_ Other

Ret of Serv

Stipulation .

_ On motion of

P. Atty

the matter la continued to ~

a Atty
Sworn and Examined:
PW

Deft

Othera
Order filed.

Hearing continued without date t i l l notion i s decided.
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Raymond N . Malouf/dm
MALOUF, MALOUF & JENKINS
Attorneys for Defendants
150 East 200 North //D
L o g a n , U T 84321
Telephone:
752-9380
DISTRICT COURT, STATE Of UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE

NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER,
husband and wife,
Plaintiff

MOTION T O STRIKE WRIT
OF EXECUTION AND MOTION
TO RELEASE LEVIED FUNDS

vs.
TH£ EMp0RIUM

PARTNERSHIP>

and

VON K. STOCKING, DON A. WHITE,
JR., and RAYMOND N. MALOUF, JR.,
general partners,
Defendant

Civil N o . 17630

Defendants move this Court strike the Writ of Execution
Issued by the Clerk of the Cour t: on October 2 6 , 198.2 for the
reason that the Writ of Execution alleges a total sum iue of
$31,693.65, which amount Is $10,000, or more, greater than
the amount o f the Judgment as recorded.
Defendants further move that the Court release that
c e r t: a I n 1 e vy a g a i n s t a ch e ck ma d e p a y a b 1 e 1" o the Cache
County Sheriff in the amount of $2,59^.'*2 for ttw reason
that the check delivered to the Sheriff was delivered as
partial satisfaction of a judgment entered in N o . 20610A in
this Court, (Malouf, M a l o u f & Jenkins v s . Don C. L o o s l e ) .
There Is no order of M i s Court

finding " •' -'•- amount of

money owed to Malouf, Malouf Si lenklns

* ivailal- * £ >r

execution in satisfaction of a judgment entered against
Raymond N . Malouf, Jr., and as such, such a levy is contrary
to law and represents an abuse of process.
DATED this c£?

day of November, 1 9 8 2 .

Raymond
aymond N . M a l o u f

/

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the ^/^

day of November, 1982,

I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to N . George
Dailies, attorney for Plaintiffs, 128 North Main, Logan, Utah
84321 along with a copy of the proposed order by depositing
said documents

In the 11 S, Mali, postage prepaid.

m.: 3<i

ihj^tmiMt^j
Secret^ri
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Raymond N. Malouf/dm
MALOUF, MALOUF & JENKINS
Attorneys for Defendants
150 East 200 North #D
Logan, UT 84321
Telephone: 752-9380
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE

NORMAN BARBER and HELEN
BARBER, husband and wife,,
Plaintiff

REPLY

vs.
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP,
and VON K. STOCKING, DON
A. WHITE, JR., and RAYMOND
N. MALOUF, JR., general
partners,
Defendant

Civil No. 17630

In support of Defendants1 prior Motion for Relief from
Judgment and to Strike Supplemental Proceedings, the Defendants
reply to the Plaintiffs' Memorandum as follows:
1.
Defendants1 Motion dated October 28, 1982 for
relief from judgment states those several objections which
exist and which provide a legitimate basis for the Court to
deny Plaintiffs1 Motion and Supplemental Proceeding.
2.
The October 28 Motion has not been resolved and it
is, therefore, inappropriate to reset supplemental proceedings.
3.
The October 28, 1982 Motion requested this Court
to explain its prior memorandum decision in view of each of
the arguments in the context of the Court's prior order^of
May 21, 1979. In that Order the Court said the Defendants1
Motions were denied without prejudice to take any appropriate
action when the judgment is sought to be enforced. Based on
that language, the Defendants did nothing further until the
Plaintiffs sought enforcement of the Judgment. At that
point, various arguments were raised. It is alleged in the
October 28 pleading that such arguments, in view of the
Court's language that appropriate action could be taken
later when the Judgment was sought to be enforced, would and
did toll at a time any 60(b) Motions need to be made.
4.
Most of the motions for relief from judgment are
not barred In any event by the three month limitation in
Rule 60(b) so the Defendants are entitled to an explanation
as to the basis of each of their objections, and the Court
should deal with each of them on other than a timeliness
basis.
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5
rhe Defendants
i ,
r.* *c: >h. r .'8, 1982
Motion, argue for relief .-r * ul : La* , ' ir ; • Defendant
Malouf based on Utah Statute 48-1-12 which only allows for
joint but not joint and several liabi lity \ inder the facts In
this case
6.
Si nee cK.* -. *-uf*
. ii the Defendants they could
take appropriate acrh A \• enforcement of the Judgment *
sought, the Court should enter an order dealing with all oi
the requests for relief filed April 30 and May 21, 1979 and
thereafter by this Court, so that the Defendnats will have a
ruling from this Court: on each of those points which will
provide either an interpretation of what appropriate relief
the Court had in mind, a basis for the Courtfs deniel of the
relief as requested then (which was never given then) and a
basis for appellet review, or any of the foregoing.
7
rhe P1aintiff has illegally a11empted to 1evy >JII
monies owed Defendant's fiini. He falsely assumes that *ll
of it is money to which the Defendant is entitled,
DATED this
/ day of November, 1982.

CERTIFICATE Of MAILING
I hereby certify that « :>n the JJ2 day °f November, 1982
I mailed a true and correct copy • ::»£' the foregoing to N.
George Daines, 128 North Main, Logan, Utah 84321 by depositing
said copy in the U.S. mail, postage prepaid.

hhh^h?Xlb,
Secret*
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Attorney at Law
128 North Main
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: 753-4403
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE

NORMAN BARBER and HELEN
BARBER, husband and wife,
Plaintiff,

)
*
)

vs.

RESPONSE TO MOTIONS

THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, and
VON K. STOCKING, DON A. WHITE,
)
JR., and RAYMOND N. MALOUF, JR.,
general partners,
*
Defendants.

Civil No. 17630

)

COME NOW the Plaintiffs Barber and respond to
Defendant Malouf1s Motion to Strike Writ of Execution to Release
Funds as Follows:
I.

CALCULATION OF AMOUNT OF JUDGMENT IS CORRECT.
Plaintiff's Counsel simply took the judgment as stated

figured the principal amount, attorneys fees and compounded interest.
If Defendant Malouf s calculations reveal a different set of
figures he should indLcate their method of computation and the
court can decide the correct computation.

This is quite irrelevant

here because any method of calculation will yield an amount at
least five times longer than the amount levied upon.
II.

EFFECTIVENESS OF A LEVY ON PARTNERSHIP FUNDS FOR A
DEBT OF ONE OF THE INDIVIDUAL PARTNERS.
At present the Plaintiffs have served the Sheriff with

an execution respecting the interest of Mr. Ray Malouf as a
partner reletive to a sum of money the Sheriff holds which is
payable to Malouf, Malouf & Jenkins a partnership.

Concurrently

therewith Mr. Ray Malouf was served with a Motion and Order
respecting Supplementary Proceedings requiring him to be present oji
November 1, 1982 to which he has again objected and to which the

106
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Plaintiffs have responded.
The Utah Code handles this situation with specificity.

See

§48-1-25 U.C.A. 19.53, wherein it states that under these
circumstances the court shall determine the rights of the debtor
partner to the asset in question and shall direct that amount to
be applied against the unsatisfied judgment.

Had Mr. Malouf not

objected that hearing would have occurred on November 1, 1982.
Pending that hearing no funds can or should be ordered released
from the Sheriff's custody.
The fact that Mr. Malouf has filed yet another frivolous
motion to avoid his proper appearance should not be the occasion
for this court to allow him to further escape the effect of this
unsatisfied judgment.
WHEREFORE Plaintiffs pray that the Court direct Defendant
Malouf to declare what specific interest he has in the funds
held pursuant to §48-1-25, that the Sheriff might properly
apply that amount against his unsatisfied judgment.
DATED this

y

h

day of

IVY/IM/V^

, 1982.

N. George Daines^
Attorney at Law

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Response to Motions was mailed, postage prepaid to
Mr. Raymond N. Malouf of MALOUF, MALOUF & JENKINS, 150 2ast
200 North #D, Logan, Utah 84321 on the

< rA

%

day of K'Vv^ivlVi^',

1982.

^<l(<i>>)^lx/;^fiiL

EXHIBIT
109

IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OP CACHE COUNTY, UTAH

NORMAN BARBER and HELEN
BARBER, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
vs.
Civil Number 176 30

THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP,
and VAN K. STOCKING, DON A
WHITE, JR., and RAYMOND N.
MALOUF, JR., general partners,
Defendants.

Defendant Raymond N. Malouf, has filed a Motion For Relief
From Judgement and to strike Supplemental Proceedings.

No new

matters have been raised in this motion that have not previously
been decided by the court in granting the judgement in question,
therefore, the motion is denied and the previous order staying
Supplemental Proceedings will be terminated.

As to the motion

to strike a writ of execution, and a motion for release of levied
funds; if such funds belongs to third-oarties they mav seek relief
under 69 (j) .
Counsel for Plaintiffs to prepare the appropriate order.

DATED t h i s ^ ^ d a y of November, 19 82.

N.* oeorge
feli^
Raymond N. Malou?

No. Maia, Logan, Utah 84321
jL Z-No- //D, Logan, Utah 84321
19 &2-

Numri
SON

50

711

EXHIBIT 8

: r i 1982

110

16-1
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CONTIACTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL

15-1-4. Interest on judgments.
Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract shall conform thereto and shall
bear the interest agreed upon by the parties, which shall be specified inti*
judgment; other judgments shall bear interest at the rate nM2% per annuj^
1943. 444M;L. I Ml, d T w . | 2.
* C*
Am.odm.nt Notei - X . l&l .mend.
men* increased the interest rat* from 8% to

*******""
* " * R u k 64<<)-

« * * * * • «* Civil I W

1AA

PART VII

JUDGMENT

Rule 54. Judgments; Costs

(e) Interest and Costs to be Included in the Judgment. The
clerk must include in any judgment signed by him any interest
on the verdict or decision from the time it was rendered, and the
costs, if the same have have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk
must, within two days after the costs have been taxed or ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert
the amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar notation thereof in the Register of
Actions and in the Judgment Docket.

